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Never Mind the Brexit? Britain, Europe, the World and Brexit.  
 
Tim Oliver 
London School of Economics  
 
Abstract 
Britain’s vote to withdraw from the EU came as an unexpected shock to many in the 
UK, the rest of the EU and around the world. The UK and the remaining EU now face a 
fraught and potentially lengthy period of negotiations to settle Brexit. How might this 
change Europe? And how might it change the rest of the world’s views of Europe? This 
article looks at how Brexit could shape worldviews of Europe. It does so firstly by 
looking at the international and European roles Britain sees for itself and how the rest of 
Europe views those roles. The article then turns to views of both the UK and the EU 
from the USA, Russia and China. It argues that neither the UK nor the EU should 
overlook how external perceptions of Europe, the UK and Brexit matter because they 
will determine the strategic context in which the Brexit negotiations unfold.  
 
Introduction  
 
Britain’s vote to withdraw from the EU came as an unexpected shock to many in the 
UK, the rest of the EU and around the world. The shock was in part the result of polling 
that had suggested that Britain would vote to remain a member, but also because the 
very idea of a member state withdrawing from the EU had long been something of a 
taboo. European integration, while rarely smooth, had moved in only one direction. 
Britain’s choice to reject this – admittedly by a slim majority of 52 per cent - meant that 
for the first time the EU was faced with the loss of a member state and in the case of the 
UK one of its largest. While the potential implications for the UK of such a decision had 
long been the subject of much discussion and analysis, the implications for the EU, 
Europe and their place in the world had not.  
 
The 23rd June 2016 vote triggered complex, fraught and potentially drawn-out Brexit 
negotiations between the UK and the remaining EU. The negotiations cannot be 
reduced to UK-EU only. There are 14 different negotiations (with the term ‘negotiation’ 
used here in a broad sense) now unfolding which can be divided into three groups, as set 
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out in the table below (Oliver, 2016a). They can be divided into three groups: internal 
UK negotiations, UK-EU negotiations and internal EU negotiations. Negotiations 
between the UK, the EU and the rest of the world can be seen within the three groups. 
Such negotiations would revolve around how the rest of the world views and responds to 
Brexit.  
 
This article focuses on the international negotiations now unfolding and is divided into 
three sections. The first looks at what Brexit could mean for the UK’s relations with the 
EU and its strategic outlook internationally. As we note, how Britain moves forward 
internationally will depend not only on its own strategic thinking but how others view it 
post-Brexit. The article then examines what Brexit means for the EU’s relations with the 
UK and the rest of the world. How – or if – Brexit might change the EU and how the 
world views it is a question many outside of Europe are now addressing. To examine this 
more closely the article turns to views from the USA, Russia and China. As we note in 
the conclusion, both the UK and EU are in danger of taking for granted the world’s 
views of Brexit; views that may not be as complimentary as either might assume.  
 
United Kingdom 
 
Negotiations Participants Issues 
1. UK: Brexit narrative UK political parties, media, 
academia. 
Defining what the vote by 
the British people meant.  
2. UK: Party politics Conservative party, Labour 
party, UKIP, SNP, Liberal 
Democrats.  
Positioning of the parties to 
manage Brexit.  
3. UK: Parliament and the 
people 
MPs, Lords, UK Supreme 
Court. 
Who legally defines Brexit.  
4. UK: A united kingdom? UK Government, Scottish 
government and parliament, 
Northern Ireland 
government and assembly, 
Mayor of London. 
The role of the regions 
(especially those that voted 
remain) in negotiating 
Brexit; Scottish 
independence; Northern 
Ireland’s peace process; 
London’s place in the 
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union; England.  
5. UK: Brexit and the 
World 
UK bilateral relations with 
non-EU world 
UK relations with USA, 
emerging powers such as 
China, trade agreements, 
full membership of World 
Trade Organisation. 
 
United Kingdom-European Union 
 
Negotiations Participants Issues 
6. UK-EU: Article 50  UK, EU 27 heads of 
government, European 
Parliament, European 
Commission, European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) 
Exit agreement for the UK 
from EU institutions and 
associated arrangements.  
7. UK-EU: Brexit transition UK, EU 27 heads of 
government, European 
Parliament, European 
Commission, European 
Court of Justice (ECJ), 
EEA/EFTA members. 
Possible transition 
arrangement for UK, 
possibly inside European 
Economic Area. 
8. UK-EU: New 
relationship 
UK, political systems of EU 
27, European Parliament, 
European Commission, 
ECJ, EEA/EFTA 
members. 
Agreement between UK 
and EU over new 
relationship: EEA, EFTA, 
non-single market 
membership, free trade deal 
and others. 
9. EU(UK): Article 50, 
Brexit transition and new 
relationship. 
EU 27 governments and 
their domestic political 
structures, European 
Parliament, European 
Commission, ECJ, 
EEA/EFTA members. 
Remaining EU member 
states reach agreement over 
what to offer the UK and 
over what timeframe, 
potentially with member 
states ratifying agreement 
individually through 
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domestic ratification 
processes (parliamentary 
votes, referendums).   
10. UK-EU: Foreign, 
security and defence 
cooperation. 
UK, EU27 (especially 
France and Germany), 
NATO members, USA.  
How to continue 
cooperation on 
international matters.  
 
European Union 
 
Negotiations Participants Issues 
11. EU(EU): Rebalancing 
the Union. 
EU 27, European 
Parliament, Commission, 
ECJ. 
The new balance of power 
within the post-Brexit EU; 
place of Eurozone in EU; 
European integration, 
disintegration or muddling 
through.  
12. EU(Europe): An EU in 
a multipolar Europe 
EU, Norway, Switzerland, 
Iceland, Lichtenstein, 
Turkey, Ukraine, non-EU 
Balkan countries, UK.   
The future of the EU’s 
relations with non-EU 
European countries; EU-
EEA/EFTA relations, 
European geopolitics. 
13. EU(World): An EU in a 
multipolar world. 
EU, UK, USA, Russia, 
Ukraine, China, Turkey, 
UN, NATO.  
EU’s place in an emerging 
multipolar world.  
14. EU(Business): business 
as usual? 
EU as a union of 28 
member states until UK 
exit formally effective.  
How to let UK and rest of 
EU continue normal non-
Brexit business until UK 
withdraws.  
 
Britain’s Brexit 
 
Britain’s reputation as ‘an awkward partner’ reflects how relations with the rest of the EU 
have rarely been smooth (George, 1988). It has a history of opposition to EU policies 
and integration and a domestic political debate that has often been poisonous and where 
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membership has been viewed in a transactional zero-sum way as opposed to the positive-
sum view held elsewhere. Britain’s late membership of the EU was hardly an enthusiastic 
one, more associated with being a necessity of decline than one embraced as a positive 
way forward.  
 
Britain’s awkwardness has, however, hidden a more constructive and engaging European 
power that has seen in EU membership opportunities for itself, Europe and the wider 
Western world – not least the transatlantic relationship with the USA (Daddow and 
Oliver, 2016). Britain’s contributions include being a strong proponent of the single 
market, of pushing for deregulation, strongly supporting successive waves of EU 
enlargement, and having a good record at upholding EU laws. Despite its controversial 
rebate, the UK has been one of the largest net contributors to the EU’s budget and has 
pushed for reform of the budget to move it away from juste retour for certain national 
agricultural sectors towards a budget that reflects the modern needs of the EU. UK 
policy makers and civil society have been keen advocates of EU action on a range of 
issues from climate change to animal rights. While the arrival of large numbers of EU 
citizens from Eastern Europe might have caused problems that led to the Brexit vote, it 
should not be forgotten that unlike other EU member states the UK did not impose 
restrictions on the free movement of those citizens for the first few years after the 2004 
enlargement. Britain might have been both an advocate and an obstacle to EU efforts at 
foreign, security and defence cooperation, but so too have others – including Germany 
and France – because of the national sensitivities and realist outlooks involved (Jones, 
2016).  
 
This Janus faced approach could only be sustained for so long. While the face of a more 
positive and engaging UK was rarely seen in UK politics, it was no surprise that the 
narrative of UK-EU relations became stuck in a negative one-sided story of awkwardness 
which fed a sense in the UK that it was the odd one out in the EU. A Dutch 
commentator once noted that the UK’s debate about its EU membership suffered from 
a mentality of ‘narcissistic victimisation’: a sense that only Britain suffered at the hands of 
the EU; that only Britain saw the way forward in the world but is thwarted from doing so 
by the EU; and that only Britain had the experience and nous to see the opportunities and 
dangers at the global level (Korteweg, 2014: 99). Little wonder then that when the EU 
referendum campaign began the British elite found it difficult to offer much by way of a 
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positive message about the EU that was believed by the public. David Cameron, who like 
many other British politicians had scored easy political points by attacking an EU he 
personally did not think Britain should leave, was reaping what he had sown when the 
British people voted to leave. This is not to dismiss the EU’s own failings from the 
matter. The EU – or EEC as it was then – the UK joined in 1973 was portrayed as 
Britain’s future and a necessary political and economic union in the context of the Cold 
War. The EU of 2016 was one that, because of tensions in the Eurozone, Schengen and 
with Russia, appeared dysfunctional, weak and the past. 
 
Where then might Britain head next in terms of its wider international strategic position? 
Debate in Britain about Brexit has so far focused on the future of UK-EU trade 
relations, which given the continued size of that trading link will shape wider 
relationships post-Brexit. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify five strands of thought 
that have begun to emerge. First, a ‘Switzerland with nukes’ approach that would be an 
isolationist option whereby the UK would retreat from both European and global 
security commitments, focusing entirely on defence of the British Isles. This might play 
to domestic audiences seen in the Brexit debate that were hostile to immigration, but fail 
to tackle the risks the UK faces and would likely be deeply unpopular with allies. Second, 
a ‘pivot’ away from Europe whereby the UK would build foreign and security relations 
with the world beyond Europe, not least with the United States. However, the US itself 
has struggled to pivot away from Europe, and the UK may lack the necessary networks 
to do so. Donald Trump’s attitudes towards China and other emerging powers may 
conflict with those the UK wishes to pursue. Third, an EU-UK ‘special relationship’ 
where the UK would develop a close security relationship with the remaining EU, 
possibly as part of the withdrawal deal over a new UK-EU relationship. There is a danger 
that this would be seen by some in Britain as undermining NATO, and it is unclear if the 
rest of Europe, let alone a Eurosceptic UK public and government (especially if Brexit 
negotiations were strained) would embrace such a relationship. Fourth, a ‘Global 
European balancer’ which would see a globally orientated Britain with a strong 
commitment to European security, combining options 2 and 3. Yet it is unclear whether 
the UK could embrace such a role without risking overstretch. This role might therefore 
be viewed skeptically by both allies and competitors. Finally, there is an ‘Adrift and lost 
at sea’ option, which would also be a ‘muddling through’ approach where the UK 
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attempts to cope with events rather than shape them by making any clear but difficult 
choices.  
 
Which of the above the UK ends up pursuing will depend firstly on which the UK 
government thinks best positions it to respond to the strategic risks that Britain and its 
allies are likely to face in the near future. Second, a great deal of how Brexit unfolds will 
depend on the way in which Britain’s allies react to each option (on outside-in 
perspectives on Europe, see the introduction by Falkner). Do they, or other countries 
around the world which shape international politics, think any of the above are viable? 
 
Europe’s Brexit  
 
As noted above, Britain’s decision to leave the EU came as a shock to many elsewhere in 
Europe. For many years the rest of the EU had listened to British politicians repeatedly 
warn of or threaten a British withdrawal, often in order to play to Eurosceptic British 
domestic audiences. British politicians had done so often enough to sound like the little 
boy who cried wolf in the Aesop fable. But as the fable and now Brexit teaches us, the 
wolf eventually appeared. The EU (and as quickly became clear the UK government and 
some prominent Leave campaigners) was caught unaware by the vote, with little actual 
planning for how to deal with a Brexit. While Article 50 of the EU’s treaty – the 
withdrawal clause – sets out a framework for the withdrawal of a member state, it is 
untested and intended more of a deterrent than a carefully considered process for 
managing a complex development.  
 
Brexit negotiations are often portrayed as being ‘UK-EU’, but as the earlier list of 
negotiations makes clear that overlooks the internal UK and EU negotiations where the 
issue of unity will be amongst the most important.  The EU side of the negotiations will 
represent twenty seven member states, the European Parliament and the Commission. 
Each state has unique domestic political games. As ratification of the Canadian European 
Trade Agreement showed, it only takes one regional parliament – or a referendum, 
parliamentary vote or court ruling – to disrupt the process. Looking at how the rest of 
the EU respond to Brexit highlights how it is not simply about relations with Britain, but 
about the future of the EU. Views on Brexit will therefore also be about how Brexit 
might reshape the Union. This will be of concern to new member states such as Romania 
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or Bulgaria, who fear being left behind by further integration. For those states with few 
links to Britain, Brexit will be about securing concessions on other matters from those 
states that do. The biggest overall question the EU will grapple with is whether Brexit 
adds to forces that will lead to the EU’s disintegration or integration (Rosamond, 2016). 
As shown in the table below, various scenarios for the EU can be mapped out, each of 
which also takes into account not only the future of UK-EU relations but the future of 
the Eurozone, Schengen, relations with Russia and the attitude of the USA (Oliver, 
2016b).  
 
 Scenario 1: EU is 
weakened 
Scenario 2: EU 
muddles through 
Scenario 3: EU 
more united 
Unity of the EU 
and defining 
ideas about 
Europe as a 
political space  
UK leads the way in 
EU fragmentation, 
potentially 
unravelling EU. 
Best outcome for 
EU is a core 
Eurozone union as 
one of a series of 
overlapping 
organisations in 
Europe. 
Tensions remain 
over 
intergovernmental 
and supranational 
approaches, but 
Eurozone as heart of 
EU is strengthened. 
EU remains 
Europe’s 
predominant political 
organisation. 
Without one of its 
most awkward 
members 
integration becomes 
more likely. EU 
continues to emerge 
as the dominant 
political 
organisation in 
Europe.  
Balance of Power Adds to confused 
leadership with no 
clear leader; small or 
large states gain; 
East/South v’s 
North/West; 
Eurozone under 
pressure. 
German power 
enhanced, tensions 
with France remain, 
but EU remains 
generally rudderless. 
Clearer leadership 
for EU institutions, 
complimented by 
enhanced power of 
Germany.  
Political economy More inward 
looking, 
protectionist or 
divided.  
Retains strong 
outward looking 
agenda thanks to 
global pressures. 
A global economic 
power pushing its 
own model. 
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Security and 
global relations 
EU remains a 
‘military worm’. 
Europe/EU is 
vulnerable to divide 
and rule by external 
powers. 
Fragmented military 
and security 
relationships, NATO 
and bilateral links 
remain key. EU 
remains central 
security actor on 
many new security 
challenges and major 
player in economic 
power. Continues to 
rely, with difficulties, 
on civilian power. 
EU acts more 
united with some 
military power, but 
never fulfils military 
potential without 
UK. NATO 
remains strong, but 
potential strong EU 
dimension. Other 
global powers 
continue to develop 
direct relations with 
Brussels. 
Relations with 
UK 
Difficult, UK plays 
a role in trying to 
redraw Europe’s 
political 
relationships. 
UK a close partner, 
engaged with but 
political relations 
strained by 
continued mutual 
dependence. 
UK treated as close 
but junior partner, 
similar to attitude of 
US in US-UK 
relationship. 
 
How then might the EU view the future of UK-EU relations? We can break down the 
EU’s possible response into five Is: Ideas, Interests, Institutions, International and 
Individuals (Oliver, 2016c: 697). The deepest tensions will be seen when it comes to 
balancing ideas and interests. Will the remaining EU prioritise ideas of integration and 
cooperation – of ‘ever closer union’ – to protect against the potential damage Brexit 
could do to the ideas of European unity? Eurosceptics frequently point out the EU is a 
political project. Will it therefore be the ideas behind this project that shape the EU’s 
response? Or will it be national interests that win out thanks to pressure from the likes of 
German car manufacturers, Irish farm exporters or consideration of an EU trade deficit 
with the UK that in 2014 (ONS, 2015) hit a record high of £61.6 billion? This is not to 
suggest that interests and ideas are mutually exclusive. But which will shape the 
negotiations most? Institutional limits such as WTO rules and the EU’s own rules limit 
what the EU can and cannot do to punish the UK or offer it in terms of a new 
relationship. International pressures may help convince some EU member states to seek 
 10 
a quick agreement with a country that still packs a punch internationally. We should also 
not overlook the individuals involved. How will individual leaders such as German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel or the European Parliament’s Brexit negotiator Guy 
Verhofstadt approach negotiations? A Brexit will not have a uniform effect across the 
EU, meaning some leaders will take the issue more importantly than others. It will also 
be these individual leaders who will need to rebuild trust between the UK and the EU. A 
Brexit would make worse a relationship where trust has been lost thanks to the UK’s 
renegotiation and perceptions elsewhere of UK indifference to crises in the Eurozone, 
Schengen and over Ukraine. 
 
One area of notable concern for the remaining EU, given the UK’s leading role in it, is 
where Brexit leaves the EU’s ambitions in foreign, security and defence. The withdrawal 
of a permanent UN Security Council member, nuclear power, and leading international 
donor cannot but have an impact on the EU in these areas. One of the first implications 
is to add to the list of issues that draw the EU’s attention inwards rather than to external 
ones. As the Dahrendorf Forum’s Foresight Exercise noted, Brexit helps make the EU’s 
domestic and institutional challenges the highest priority. One possible outcome the 
Foresight Exercise (Pfeifer and Sus, 2016) identified was Brexit leading to a ‘profound 
neglect of any coherent foreign policy strategy’. As the article in this special issue by 
Nathalie Tocci explains in detail, the outcome of the UK’s EU referendum 
overshadowed the meeting of the European Council when the new ‘European Global 
Strategy’ was presented by High Representative Frederica Mogherini. Yet as the article in 
this special issue by Karen Smith notes, the global strategy has become as much about 
creating a narrative to aid the EU’s unity as about the EU’s approach to the world. The 
inward looking concerns of the strategy serve as a reminder of the problems that beset 
the EU and which Brexit has added to.  
 
Will Brexit at least ease the tensions the EU faces, removing an obstacle that has 
sometimes blocked cooperation in foreign, security and defence matters? As Pfeifer 
(2016) has argued, some elsewhere in the EU might well see the removal of a country 
known for blocking EU defence cooperation as a possible way forward. It was therefore 
no surprise that the EU’s initial response to Brexit in part focused on moving forward 
with defence cooperation. However, as Pfeifer notes, EU defence cooperation will 
remain stunted as a result of five factors: 
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‘Germany’s indecisiveness regarding its military role, strong nationally supported 
arms industries, nationalistic tendencies among EU Member States, decreasing 
defence budgets and the parallelism of EU and NATO in the field, make a 
stronger commitment for EU defence policy among member states unlikely.’ 
 
Non-EU views of Brexit 
 
The way Brexit unfolds for both the UK and the EU will depend not only on the 
domestic responses of both, but also on how several non-European states respond to it. 
Europe’s three hegemons – Germany, the USA and Russia – will shape the broad 
political, economic and security context within which Brexit unfolds, with the USA and 
Russia applying pressure from the outside. The choices of these three – whether to 
engage, exploit or ignore – will shape the context of European and international politics 
in which Brexit unfolds. Into this we can also add an emerging world power in the form 
of China. Its reaction to Brexit gives clues to how Brexit will shape not only Europe and 
the UK, but also views of both around the world.  
 
The USA 
 
US attitudes towards European integration and Britain’s part in it have been difficult to 
pin down beyond general – but sometimes ambivalent – support for both. The EU is a 
product of a liberal international order that the US has pursued since 1945. Support for 
Britain’s involvement in European integration has been supported by various US 
administrations dating back to the 1960s. Yet both have come with caveats. The creation 
of a EU that is a strategic competitor in trade and potentially security and politics has 
presented the USA with a challenger rather than a junior partner. Despite hopes by some 
US administrations that UK governments would pursue closer relations with their 
European partners, successive US administrations have also been happy to continue a 
UK-US ‘special relationship’ that has brought benefits for both sides but which has 
meant the UK has been able to avoid making any clear choice to commit to the EU. At 
the same time, the USA has also balanced its commitment to the EU with strong bilateral 
relations with all EU states, something those states have pursued in return. Allegations 
that the UK has been a US ‘Trojan Horse’, sent to weaken the EU and make it serve the 
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USA, deflects attention from the close relations the USA has with every member of the 
EU (Oliver and Williams, 2016). This balancing act reflected the challenges and daily 
problems of an increasingly close economic, security and political relationship between 
the two sides of the North Atlantic. As Burgoon, Trubowitz and Oliver argue in their 
article in this special issue, while both sides have had their differences they have since the 
disappearance of the USSR pursued a globalisation agenda prioritising freer movement 
of goods, capital, services and people. The UK has been a leading proponent of such an 
agenda within the EU and in transatlantic relations.   
 
The commitment of the USA, EU and UK to this agenda has been under pressure for 
some time. The election of Donald Trump, the vote for Brexit and growing populist 
movements throughout the EU point to a growing discontent with this agenda. Where 
does this leave US views of the UK and the EU? Politics on both sides of the North 
Atlantic are wrestling with frustrations – notably, but not exclusively, amongst white 
working class voters – at globalisation, elite politics, austerity, fears about threats to 
identities (which also touch heavily on race and gender matters) and immigration. Does 
this present opportunities for cooperation? A great deal hangs on how Donald Trump 
behaves, something that is extremely difficult to predict given his erratic behaviour and 
lax attitude towards being consistent in the things he says (Quinn, 2017). That said, we 
can discern something of a broad worldview that will guide his approach, even if – as has 
become clear – it is not one shared by everyone in the Republican party or his 
administration. That worldview is one where the sovereignty of the USA is viewed in 
strict terms. The best many allies might hope for is a policy of ‘offshore balancing’ 
whereby the US will remain engaged internationally, but only intervene in cases affecting 
a narrowly-defined national interest. That may sound no bad thing. But in doing so 
Trump may lack the subtly necessary to deliver a stable transition, and could end up 
aligning the US less with a liberal world order and more with more sovereignty based 
system akin to the 19th century and one that coincides more closely with a Sino-Russian 
world view. 
 
That does not necessarily make for a happy future for either the UK or the EU. Instead 
of finding common purpose, politics in the US, UK and EU could drive forward 
nationalism and division rather than unity and cooperation. It would mean a USA acting 
on a very narrow approach of ‘America First’ as opposed to thinking about America vis-
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à-vis the general interest, that is disengaged from large multilateral trading agreements 
such as TTIP or at the WTO, and which is prepared to question long-established 
alliances such as NATO. For NATO, Brexit will mean only 18 per cent of NATO 
defence spending will come from EU states.i That said, even if the UK is included the 
amount increases only to 25 per cent with the US representing 72 per cent. In 1990 the 
US figure was closer to 60 per cent, which was still an imbalance but nowhere near as 
bad as today.ii A US that turns inwards would pose a quandary for a post-Brexit Britain 
that, as discussed earlier, aims to pursue new global trading and political links and whose 
security will continue to rely on the stability of Europe and transatlantic links. The US 
may offer the UK a bilateral trade deal, but that contrasts with Trump’s more 
protectionist stance, raises questions about what the UK can expect when it will be the 
much smaller partner (and there are no special relationships in trade negotiations), and 
when Trump’s overall position could inflict much larger damage on the wider open 
global trading system that Britain remains a committed member of. 
 
Russia 
 
As the article in this special issue by Zubok and Wohlforth point to, geopolitical 
calculations figure prominently in Russian government and political thinking on 
international matters. It should come as no surprise then that Britain’s withdrawal from 
the EU is viewed by some in Russia as a sign of the EU’s weakness and decline in size 
and clout. This contrasts with the EU’s own outlook which has tended to look beyond 
the importance of hard power and geopolitics, focusing more on what some have termed 
a ‘post-modern’ outlook on international affairs. Recent events have served to remind 
the EU that traditional thinking on international affairs – about borders, sovereignty and 
nationalism – remain powerful. Events in Ukraine and Crimea might have caused 
concerns throughout Europe at the ways by which borders can be redrawn and the 
implications of this. But within and around the EU itself the implications of redrawing 
the map are never far away thanks to secessionist movements in Scotland, Northern 
Ireland, Belgium, Spain and the continued tensions within the Balkans and Turkey. The 
fragmentation of the UK, for example, would almost certainly see the end of the UK as a 
nuclear power due to the location of Britain’s nuclear forces in Scotland (Dorman, 2014).  
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While some in Russia might have viewed Brexit through a geopolitical lens, that did not 
necessarily mean they welcomed it. There has been much debate as to whether Russia 
would gain or lose from the EU’s decline. Brexit would remove from the EU a country 
that has been amongst the strongest backers of EU sanctions against Russia following 
the annexation of Crimea. At the same time, Russia remains heavily dependent on a 
dynamic, prosperous and integrated European market. UK-Russian trading links might 
be small in comparison with those Russia has elsewhere in Europe, but the financial and 
services links are substantial. Economic and political chaos in Europe is therefore not 
necessarily in Russia’s interests, and would dash any remaining hopes that Russia’s own 
efforts at economic cooperation through the Eurasian Economic Union could somehow 
link with those of the EU. Instead, Europe and Russia could be driven apart, with 
European decline aiding Russia’s turn towards Asia.  
 
Looking beyond the possible economic and geopolitical implications, Brexit has helped 
dampen the EU’s normative power in Russia (Gromyko, 2015). The EU’s normative 
power was already strained by problems in the Eurozone and Schengen. For some 
nationalists in Russia, the EU – and Europe more broadly – had abandoned traditional 
values such as Christianity, the family, national pride, respect for law and order and 
instead embraced an uncontrollable and unstable agenda connected to diversity. Russian 
state media efforts to contrast the EU’s uncertainty and malaise with Russia’s stability 
and strength can, of course, be critiqued. But that portrayal also found an audience 
across the EU, emboldening those in Europe more aligned with Russian views on 
nationalism, sovereignty and values. Debate in Ukraine has also felt something of this 
(Getmanchuk, 2015). To those Ukrainians who fought for closer connections with the 
rest of Europe as opposed to Russia, the EU has been viewed as a source of 
modernisation and European identity. Brexit casts a shadow over those hopes, 
weakening both the EU and UK’s appeal. Whether Britain will notice this, however, 
offers a final note of comparison with Russia. Both Britain and Russia are former 
superpowers that have passed through periods of profound decline. Both will continue 
to attempt – and sometimes succeed – at ‘punching above their weights’ internationally. 
However, they also show the futility of hoping that either will fully come to terms with 
their reduced status anytime soon. 
 
China  
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China’s views of Brexit can be broken down into economics and strategic relations. In a 
rare moment of international agreement, China found itself aligned with both Japan and 
the USA when it stated that it would prefer the UK to remain in the EU. China’s prime 
concern was the economic uncertainty for UK-Chinese relations, the UK economy and 
that of the rest of the EU. Full-market access to the EU has been one of the positives for 
China in UK-EU relations. For the UK, playing the role of gateway to the EU’s single 
market was a selling point to China along with Britain’s well-regulated, stable and open 
economy that Chinese investors could rely on. British governments have made increasing 
efforts to court China, with Chinese investment in a range of infrastructure projects 
(Heathrow airport, high speed rail projects and Hinkley Point nuclear power station) and 
across industry making China an ever-present aspect of UK life. The potential for Brexit 
to change this remains an abiding concern for China, and not simply with regard to the 
UK. China, like the USA and other large powers, have relations with Europe that are 
both multilateral ones with the EU and bilateral with the various member states. 
Chinese-German relations, in particular, have been very close as a result of both being 
leading industrial and exporting economies. The potential for Brexit to turn the UK and 
EU inwards has been something that Chinese officials have worried about. Britain, for 
example, has been a strong supporter of China being granted ‘Market Economy Status’, 
something others in the EU have been uncertain about. Meanwhile, the British 
government has gone to great lengths since the referendum result to make clear that the 
UK remains an open, international economy. This contrasts with parts of the UK’s 
referendum debate – not least over immigration and globalisation – that will not have 
passed unnoticed in China. Any future trade negotiations with the UK are likely to run 
into the thorny issue of immigration and visas, something that has already arisen with 
regard to UK-India relations. They are also likely to be shaped by whatever deal the UK 
is able to secure over future relations with the EU.  
 
As the article in this special issue by Rabe and Gippner notes, Chinese and European 
investment in each other effect the mutual perceptions of each sides power and status in 
global politics. The UK’s referendum showed that China’s relations with powers such as 
the UK cannot be built on trading and investment links alone. Chinese President Xi had 
put a great deal of effort into developing close relations with the UK, efforts that had led 
to a range of closer economic links. This has only taken relations so far. Delays and 
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doubts over the Hinkley Point C nuclear power station – which is to be developed in a 
deal involving France and China – along with doubts and suspicions about investments 
by Chinese state owned companies, show the relationship remains dogged by questions 
of trust. The motives and interest of the UK and China are not necessarily the same, with 
differences over human rights, rule of law and relations with the USA being sticking 
points to say nothing of continued historical prejudices on both sides. The same can be 
said to overhang Chinese-EU relations in a broader sense. Some form of larger strategic 
partnerships would be needed if relations were to become more stable. Brexit does little 
to help create the conditions for this because as discussed earlier, Britain’s own strategic 
outlook is now in flux. For example, closer UK-US relations under President Trump may 
come with US demands over how far UK-Chinese relations can develop in terms of 
trade deals and investments and certainly over any attempts to build a strategic 
partnership. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Writing in 1969, Lord Dahrendorf defined the role of a public intellectual as, ‘to doubt 
everything that is obvious, to make relative all authority, to ask all those questions that 
no one else dares to ask’ (Dahrendorf, 1969: 51). Until the morning after the 23 June 
2016 referendum, the question of what Brexit might mean for the EU had been one 
many had shied away from. In part this can be put down to Britain’s politicians repeated 
threats to leave the EU leaving the rest of the Union somewhat indifferent, akin to the 
townsfolk in the Aesop fable of the boy who cried wolf. But it also reflected a taboo at 
contemplating the fragmentation or disintegration of the EU. Ideas and theories of 
disintegration have figured as a minor area of study in European integration, if they were 
studied at all. Brexit, along with the problems in the Eurozone and Schengen, remind us 
that political structures that appear fixed can be thrown into question. The EU might 
have survived many past crises, with crises playing an important role in moving forward 
European integration. To imagine that this can only move in one direction, however, is 
to be myopic. The question of how the EU might disintegrate might be an unsettling one 
for some who study the EU (and is also one few in the UK – including Eurosceptics – 
appear to have given much thought to), but it is one that cannot be overlooked. While it 
remains doubtful that Brexit alone will be responsible for unravelling the EU, what might 
do so remains largely unexplored.  
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One way in which the impact of Brexit can be studied is by viewing it from different 
perspectives whether they be those from within the rest of the EU or from taking an 
outside-in approach. Neither the UK nor the remaining EU should take for granted the 
idea that Brexit will improve the position of either of them vis-à-vis each other or in the 
views of others around the world. As we have seen, the perspectives of others elsewhere 
in the EU of the UK and the impact of Brexit will be central to defining what new UK-
EU relationship emerges and how European politics more broadly develops to cope with 
it. At the same time, views from the USA, Russia and China remind us that what the UK 
or the EU thinks Brexit will mean is but one interpretation.  
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